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BORIS YELTSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY LEGACY
Robert H. Donaldson, Ph.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the policy legacy that an individual political leader
leaves to his country should begin by considering the extent to which a
leader and his personal characteristics can have an impact on political
events. The study of leadership, personality, and politics has been a pre-
occupation of social scientists for many decades, and there is a rich litera-
ture drawn from observations of a variety of political environments, from
democratic to totalitarian.' The analysis that best frames the present study
is that of Fred Greenstein in his classic, Personality and Politics! Of par-
ticular relevance is Greenstein's summary discussion of the circum-
stances in which individual actions affect events: "[t]he likelihood of per-
sonal impact varies with (1) the degree to which the actions take place in
an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the ac-
tor in the environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weak-
nesses."3 The latter two conditions are self-explanatory, but the first re-
-Paper presented to 41st annual meeting of International Studies Association, March
18, 2000. Dr. Donaldson is a former President of University of Tulsa and is currently Trus-
tees Professor of Political Science, University of Tulsa. Harvard University, B.A. (1964),
M.A. (1966), and Ph.D. (1969) in Political Science.
1. For a more extensive theoretical discussion of the impact of a leader's personality on
political situations, see generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948);
SIDNEY HOOK, THE HERO IN HISTORY (1943); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL
CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (4th ed. 1992); FRED I.
GREENSTEIN, PERSONALITY AND POLITICS (1969); PERSONALITY AND POLITICS (Gordon J.
DiRenzo ed., 1974); A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS (Margaret G.
Hermann & Thomas W. Milburn eds., 1977); BARBARA KELLERMAN, POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP: A SOURCE BOOK (1986); Alexander L. George, The "Operational Code": A
Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making, 13 INT'L STUD.
Q. 190 (1969).
2. See GREENSTEIN, supra note 1.
3. Id. at 42.
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quires some further elaboration. Political environments that "admit of
restructuring," Greenstein explains, are "unstable" or in a state of "pre-
carious equilibrium," whereas a situation that does not admit of restruc-
turing would be one in which the outcome "can be expected to occur even
if some of the contributing factors are eliminated."4
In the context of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (or of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before it), it is not diffi-
cult to determine which leaders are strategically placed so that their pecu-
liar strengths or weaknesses can be brought to bear on the content of pol-
icy. In the Soviet period, since the time of Stalin, the General Secretary of
the Communist Party occupied the strategic leadership position, whereas
in the post-Soviet period, and especially after the passage of the 1993
Constitution,5 the President of the Russian Federation is positioned to
dominate the policy process. Under what circumstances, then, i.e., at
which times or in which issue areas, might we expect the occupants of
these positions to have impact on policy? Guided by Greenstein's first
proposition, we might hypothesize that a leader's impact would be greater
in times of political transition or internal instability. It would also be
greater in times when an unrestrained individual dictatorship (a "cult of
personality," in Soviet parlance) overrode the norms of collective leader-
ship in the top councils of the party or state. Conversely, it would be un-
likely that a leader would have much impact at relatively settled times,
when the distribution of influence among interest groups and institutions
is fairly static and shared governance (or "collective leadership") pre-
vails. Similarly, opportunities for an individual leader to restructure the
political environment are limited at times (or in particular issue areas)
when doctrine or ideology is rigidly adhered to and leaves little room for
maneuver.
Looking at Moscow's foreign policy since World War II, we can
easily discern occasions when Stalin's power was unrestrained and his
personality traits had significant impact on policy. Though hardly unbi-
ased, Nikita Khrushchev gave powerful testimony to the Twentieth Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the impact
of Stalin's paranoia on Soviet foreign policy:
Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious .... Everywhere
and in everything he saw 'enemies,' 'two-facers,' and 'spies.'. . . He
had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his sus-
4. Id. at 42-43.
5. See KONSTYITUTSIIA (Rossiiskoy Federatsii) [Constitution of the Russian Federation]
(1993), translated in 16 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P.




piciousness and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the
USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations.6
The opposite case - relatively little impact of the leader's personality on
foreign policy - is well illustrated in the study of the Brezhnev era.
Termed by his successor Gorbachev "the era of stagnation," the Brezhnev
period in Soviet history was characterized by the collective rule of rela-
tively colorless politicians who represented strong interests and institu-
tions; it was also a time of doctrinal rigidity and established routine. Pol-
icy outcomes during this period could usually be expected without regard
to the particular personalities at the Party's helm. This pattern was not
broken during the two brief gerontocratic administrations that followed
Brezhnev's. Not until Gorbachev began to consolidate his power as Gen-
eral Secretary in the late 1980s did the Soviet political environment again
admit of "restructuring," indeed, perestroika, its Russian translation, was
Gorbachev's preferred slogan. The foreign policy record of his admini-
stration fairly clearly demonstrated the impact of his personal leadership,
as he guided the choice of key personnel, reduced the role of the party
bureaucracy, discarded outdated Marxist-Leninist tenets, and conducted
an innovative personal diplomacy.7
Gorbachev's experiment in perestroika was an immense failure, re-
sulting in the collapse of the political institutions of the USSR and the
breakup of the country itself. Stepping into this precarious environment,
which decidedly "admitted of restructuring," Boris Yeltsin clearly occu-
pied the strategic location from which he could exert far-reaching impact
on the foreign policy of his newly established realm. In Greenstein's
framework, it was the third variable that would prove decisive. On Yel-
tsin's political skills, the strengths and weaknesses of his personality,
would ultimately depend the determination of his personal impact as a
leader. He was destined by his situation for greatness; but in Sidney
Hook's terms, his personal skills would determine whether he would go
down in history as a "Great Man" or a "Great Failure."'
6. ROBERT H. DONALDSON & JOSEPH L. NOGEE, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA:
CHANGING SYSTEMS, ENDURING INTERESTS 58 (1998) (citing NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV,
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TESTAMENT 585, 600 (Strobe Talbott trans., 1974)).
Following the Khrushchev quotation, Nogee and I drew the following conclusion: "[nlo
account of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar years, and no explanation of the origins of the
Cold War, can be complete without an awareness of the extent to which Stalin's policies and
personality required isolationism, an atmosphere of hostility, and an omnipresent enemy." Id.
7. See generally ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 212-51 (1996) (discussing
Gorbachev's personal impact on Soviet foreign policy).
8. See GREENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 45-46 (discussing HOOK, supra note 1).
Hook's interest, of course, is in lending precision to the notion of the
Great Man. Therefore, he is concerned with the individual who, because
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Although Gorbachev had set a new direction and forged new rela-
tionships, the foreign policy challenges facing Yeltsin demanded consid-
erable leadership skill. To him fell the unique opportunity of defining a
new national identity for Russia and establishing the basic concept for its
national security. Moreover, with the collapse of the long-dominant
Communist Party, he would need to build the new institutions that would
shape foreign policy. Like Gorbachev's, his foreign policy could help set
the direction for economic and social changes in the country and could
gain the foreign assistance that might spark its recovery from a long
downward slide. A totally new challenge lay in establishing relationships
of trust and mutual assistance with the fourteen other "newly independent
states" that emerged from the Soviet collapse. Russia's new constructive
relationships with the West were not yet solidified, and immediate atten-
tion to the "non-West" would be required to reduce threats to the security
of the borders of Russia and her new neighbors. Finally, Yeltsin would
have to pursue policies that ensured that Russia found a prominent "place
at the table," to ensure safeguarding not only of its traditional interests,
but of its concerns relating to the new dangers of proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, ethno-religious conflict and terrorism. To determine
the shape of Boris Yeltsin's foreign policy legacy and to assess the im-
pact of his personality on Russian foreign policy of the past decade, a
summary of Yeltsin's record in responding to each of these challenges
follows.9
II. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER YELTSIN
A. Basic Concepts of Yeltsin's Foreign Policy
Boris Yeltsin's primary aim in foreign policy, like that of Gorba-
chev's before him, was to create a non-threatening external environment
that would be most conducive to his country's internal economic and po-
litical development. As in the early decades of Soviet rule, this concentra-
tion on domestic development, together with relative shortcomings in
military strength, produced a foreign policy of accommodation, re-
trenchment and risk-avoidance, at least in Russia's relations with states
beyond the borders of the former USSR.
The fall of the CPSU and its Marxist-Leninist ideology, together
with the disintegration of the USSR itself, left a conceptual void in the
of especially great talents, is able to alter the course of events. For our
purposes, the Great Failure is equally significant: an actor's capabilities
may be relevant to an outcome in a negative as well as positive sense.
Id. at 46.
9. A fuller account of this record can be found in DONALDSON & NOGEE, supra note 6, at
108-282. Much of the following discussion draws on this record and is intended to supple-
ment the book's account.
[Vol. 7:285
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foreign policy of the newly independent Russian Federation that raised to
the forefront the question of Russia's national identity. Russia had never
existed as a nation-state; rather, during both the Tsarist and Soviet peri-
ods it had been a multinational empire with messianic ambitions. Unlike
other European imperial states, the modem Russian nation was not
formed prior to the period of colonial expansion. Moreover, the tsars,
unlike the rulers of Britain or France, colonized lands that bordered their
home territories, thus producing an unusual intermixing of Russian and
non-Russian peoples."0 Further complicating the definition of Russia's
national identity is the fact that twenty-five million ethnic Russians now
live outside the Russian Federation, in the other newly independent states
of the former Soviet Union.
Not only are the people of the Russian Federation experiencing new
geopolitical confines, they are also acutely aware of the relative weakness
of their state, in comparison to the superpower status enjoyed by the
USSR at the height of its power. The dizzying economic decline of the
early 1990s produced a profound sense of national humiliation, as Rus-
sia's leaders, first Gorbachev, then Yeltsin, were perceived as meeting
with Western leaders in the role of supplicants for foreign aid. The com-
bination of a loss of national mission, a wounded national pride, and a
confused national identity rendered more acute the need for Yeltsin to
articulate a sense of national purpose in the foreign policy of the new
Russia. As presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich wrote in March 1992:
"foreign policy with us does not proceed from the directions and priori-
ties of a developed statehood. On the contrary, the practice of our foreign
policy.., will help Russia become Russia.""
Yeltsin assigned the task of spelling out the basic principles of Rus-
sian foreign policy in the early months of 1992 to Foreign Minister An-
drei Kozyrev, a young professional diplomat who had spent sixteen years
in the Department of International Organizations of the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.' 2 On the foundations of the liberal internationalism of
Gorbachev's "new thinking," Kozyrev, not surprisingly, constructed a
heavy reliance on Russian participation in international institutions. De-
10. See generally Margot Light, Foreign Policy Thinking, in INTERNAL FACTORS IN
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 35-38 (Neil Malcolm et al. eds., 1996); see also KAREN DAWISHA
& BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL
26-29 (1994).
11. James Richter, Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity, in THE
SOURCES OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 69 (Celeste A. Wallender ed.,
1996) (quoting Sergei Stankevich, Derzhava v Poiskakh Sebia, NEZAVISIMAYA, Mar. 28,
1992).
12. See JEFFREY T. CHECKEL, IDEAS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE:
SOVIET/RuSSIAN BEHAVIOR AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 107-15 (1997) (describing
Kozyrev's views).
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termined to liberate Russia from the burdens of empire, the messianism,
and the over-reliance on military instruments that had characterized both
the Tsarist and the Soviet periods, Kozyrev developed foreign policy
ideas centered on the promotion of human rights and the universal values
of global economic, environmental and nuclear security realized through
a community of democratic states. Since democracies do not attack other
democracies, a democratic Russia would have nothing to fear from the
West.
If the purpose of Russian foreign policy was the creation of the con-
ditions in which the new nation could prosper, Kozyrev reasoned, it
would be necessary for Russia to gain membership in the club of devel-
oped democratic states and their economic institutions, thus assuming the
"fitting place that has been predetermined for us by history and geogra-
phy. 3 During these early months of 1992, not only Kozyrev but also
President Yeltsin and Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, who was
responsible for economic reform, consistently voiced these "liberal west-
ernizing" views of Russia's national interests. 4
The tradition of expressing the basic principles of policy in a pro-
grammatic and officially-endorsed statement still runs strong in post-
Soviet Russia. Accordingly, Kozyrev was urged to develop a "foreign
policy concept" that would be discussed in the government and adopted
by the Supreme Soviet and the President, to serve as the expression of
national consensus as well as guidance for diplomats, parliamentarians
and others.
For Kozyrev, Gaidar and other liberals, the Western democracies
were the ideal model and partner for Russia. Russia must shed its tradi-
tion of distinctiveness and its illusions of serving a "special role" as a
"bridge" between Europe and Asia. And it must avoid the temptations of
assuming a leading role in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), 5 not only because reintegration of Russia's economy with those of
the other former Soviet republics would slow market-oriented reforms
and integration with Atlantic and European economic institutions, but
also because Russia's assumption of a peacekeeping role in the troubled
bordering states would restore the privileged status of the military and
13. The Union Left Russia a Poor Foreign-Policy Legacy, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SOVIET PRESs, Apr. 29, 1992 at 4 (condensing and translating Vladimir Abarinov and Vitaly
Tretyakov's original article appearing in NEZAVISIMAYA, Apr. 1, 1992, at 1, 3).
14. The terms "Liberal Westernizers," "Pragmatic Nationalists" and "Fundamentalist
Nationalists," are borrowed from Light, supra note 10, at 33-100.
15. See Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8, 1991,
31 I.L.M. 143 (1992) [hereinafter CIS Agreement]; see also Protocol to the Agreement Es-
tablishing the Commonwealth of Independent States signed at Minsk on 8 December 1991




thereby threaten the tender shoots of democracy in Russia.
Juxtaposed to this "westernizing" or "Atlanticist" orientation of the
Foreign Ministry was a "pragmatic nationalist" or "Eurasianist" view-
point that was expressed by officials in a variety of government and aca-
demic institutions. From this perspective, articulated forcefully by presi-
dential advisor Sergei Stankevich, Russia was indeed separate and dis-
tinct from the West, even more so with its new boundaries and did have a
special mission to serve as a bridge between Western and Eastern civili-
zations. Foreign policy must be more than pragmatic opportunism; with-
out displaying messianism, Russia needed a mission, in Stankevich's
words, "to initiate and maintain a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civili-
zations and states. Russia the conciliator, Russia the unifier, Russia the
harmonizer.... A country that takes in West and East, North and South,
and thus is uniquely capable ... of harmoniously unifying many different
elements, of achieving a historic symphony." 6 For Stankevich, Eurasian-
ism was not a rejection of the West, but a balanced policy, although the
immediate requirements of balance were to heighten emphasis on the
East. With the West, Russia at best could aspire to a role as junior part-
ner, "not worth accepting."' 7 The very first priority for Soviet diplomacy,
however, was "to talk in tougher tones,"18 to defend the Russian popula-
tion and Russian heritage in the other states of the former Soviet Union
from any form of discrimination or attack. Although the "pragmatic na-
tionalists" did not go so far as to advocate forcible revision of the
boundaries of the Russian Federation, they clearly disagreed with
Kozyrev and Gaidar in arguing that Russia should be prepared to make
economic, political and diplomatic sacrifices in order to promote tighter
integration of the CIS.
By the end of 1992, this internal criticism was combining with exter-
nal events, including the disappointing Western response to Russia's re-
quests for economic assistance, to bring to an end the "romantic" phase of
Russian foreign policy, and the movement of Russian liberals closer to-
ward the centrist foreign policy views of the "pragmatic nationalists."
Another factor contributing to this coalescence was the growing political
strength of the "Red-Brown coalition" of communists and extreme na-
tionalists, whose members voiced an even more sharply critical "funda-
16. A Power in Search of Itself, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Apr. 29, 1992,
at 1 (condensing and translating Sergei Stankevich's original article appearing in
NEZAVISIMAYA, Mar. 28, 1992, at 4). Stankevich's essay bore some resemblance to Stalin's
famous article, Don't Forget the East, published almost three-quarters of a century before.
Although it notably lacked the Marxist-Leninist terminology, it was similar to the earlier
article in seeking to restore balance to Russia's policy. See ROBERT H. DONALDSON, SOVIET
POLICY TOWARD INDIA: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY 19 (1974).
17. See A Power in Search of Itself, supra note 16, at 4.
18. Id.
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mentalist nationalist" point of view. Most of the attention given to this
orientation was generated by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the mis-
leadingly-named Liberal Democratic Party, a neo-fascist party which
showed surprising strength in the parliamentary elections of December
1993. Other proponents included Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Simply stated, the foreign
policy idea expressed by this group sought to recreate the Russian em-
pire-up to and even surpassing the borders of the former USSR-by the
use of force, if necessary.
Unlike the "pragmatic nationalists," the "fundamentalists" were
openly anti-Western, professing to see Western aid as a conspiracy to
weaken the Russian economy, and opposing any further moves to inte-
grate Russia into the world economy. They defined the Russian nation in
ethnic rather than civic terms, with some chauvinists openly voicing anti-
Jewish and anti-Islamic sentiments. Appealing to many disaffected ele-
ments in the military and security establishments, politicians of this orien-
tation advocated the restoration of a strong, authoritarian imperial state in
Russia. More so than their "pragmatic" counterparts, these extreme na-
tionalists were the late twentieth-century heirs of the Slavophiles, con-
temptuously denouncing "Westernizers" for thinking that Western culture
or political institutions were worthy of imitation, and depicting Russian
civilization as distinctive and superior.
The official foreign policy concept approved by President Yeltsin in
April 1993 reflected the complete abandonment of the "liberal Westerniz-
ing" idea and the convergence of "establishment" thinking around the
"pragmatic nationalist" viewpoint. The final document, the authoritative
statement of Yeltsin's foreign policy priorities, emphasized Russia's
rights and responsibilities in the states of the former USSR (generally
referred to as blizhnee zarubezhe, or "near abroad"). 9
Of the nine "vitally important interests" listed in the document, only
the third pertained to the world outside the borders of the former USSR.
In referring to this domain, the authorized summary of the document
mentioned the countries of Eastern Europe ("which are in our historical
sphere of interests") and of Western Europe (whose "integration without
Russia could do serious damage to the Russian Federation's vital inter-
19. See Russia's National Interest and Threats to its Security, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SovIET PRESS, May 26, 1993, at 13 (condensing and translating Vladislav Chernov's original
article appearing in NEZAVISIMAYA, Apr. 29, 1993, at 1). The final version of the "foreign
policy concept" was classified and never published, but this summary, written by a member
of the Security Council staff, is widely believed to be authoritative. See Light, supra note 10,
at 69-70; see also Leon Aron, The Emergent Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy, in THE




ests") before it referred to Russia's relations with the United States.2 °
Evidently seeking to correct the perceived earlier imbalance in this rela-
tionship, the summary spoke of common interests that create the precon-
ditions for developing partnership, but it stressed that United States-
Russian interests did not always coincide, while complaining about "dis-
criminatory restrictions in the commercial, economic, scientific and tech-
nological spheres."'"
In the Asian-Pacific region, priority was given to "urgent ... con-
solidat[ion of] the breakthrough" in relations with China ("from our
standpoint, the region's most important state") over "normalizing" rela-
tions with Japan, where "the expediency of continuing to search for a
solution to the territorial problem" was qualified by the caveat, "but not
to the detriment of Russia's interests. 22 The document expressed concern
over the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula and on
the Indian subcontinent, and it deplored the tensions in South and West
Asia from the context of their harmful influence on the former Soviet
states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. In the Middle East, it called
for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while also envisioning a
greater Russian role "in resolving the problems in and around Iraq" and a
"stronger Russian presence in the regional arms and raw materials mar-
ket."23 Clearly reflecting a reduced global involvement on Moscow's part,
the concept document mentioned Central and South America, Africa, and
Australia only in the context of "the world community's common efforts
to settle regional conflicts. 2 4 "Top priority" and "fundamental impor-
tance" in Russian foreign policy was reserved to the area of the former
Soviet Union. 2' Even while asserting that Russia remained a great power,
the concept document stressed its special mission in this sphere:
the Russian Federation, despite the crisis it is experiencing, remains a
great power in terms of its potential, its influence on the course of
world events and the responsibility it bears as a result of this. It is re-
sponsible not only for the new world order that has arisen since the
collapse of the socialist camp, but especially for the creation of a new
system of positive relations among the states that used to make up the
Soviet Union, and it is the guarantor of the stability of these rela-
tions.26





25. Russia's National Interest and Threats to its Security, supra note 19, at 14.
26. Id.
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Yeltsin's concept document emphasized that, in its relations with the
former Soviet republics, Russia followed a policy seeking "the greatest
possible degree of integration" based on the principle of "strictly volun-
tary participation and reciprocity.""7 If certain states chose not to cooper-
ate in some spheres, then it was essential to move ahead in developing
arrangements "with the interested countries alone."28 Specific tasks in this
realm included the creation of an effective collective security system,
ensuring Russia's status as the only nuclear state in the CIS, securing the
external borders of the Commonwealth, and developing and improving
the peacekeeping mechanism "on the basis of a mandate from the UN or
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."29 Special ur-
gency was assigned to the "problems of ensuring military security that
have arisen as a result of the Soviet Union's disintegration. ,30
Judging from the published summary, the tone of Yeltsin's concept
statement fell short of the open hostility toward the external world that
was typical of Marxist-Leninist pronouncements and that is still evident
in the expressions of "fundamentalist nationalist" politicians. Clearly, the
official statement of guiding policy ideas was less oriented toward par-
ticipation in multilateral institutions and more forcefully assertive in its
enunciation of Russia's objectives than Moscow's foreign policy had
been during the previous year.
Andrei Kozyrev remained the target of hostile criticism from parlia-
ment and the press-and even, on occasion, from President Yeltsin him-
self-until after the December 1995 elections, when he resigned as for-
eign minister to take a seat in the new Duma.31 His former ally, Yegor
Gaidar, has noted of Kozyrev that his main weakness was "that he wanted
so badly to be foreign minister."32 As soon as Yeltsin notices such a trait
in a member of his team, Gaidar wrote, that individual loses Yeltsin's
respect and the chance to speak his own mind. He ends up as a "yes
man."33 Yeltsin's choice as Kozyrev's replacement was a study in con-
trast-Yevgeny Primakov, an academician whose political career had
benefited from the patronage of Aleksandr Yakovlev. Trained as an Ara-
bist, he spent five years as a Pravda correspondent in the Middle East.
With Yakovlev's sponsorship, he became a close aide to Gorbachev,
serving on his Presidential Council and Security Council. After the
August coup, he had been appointed as chief of the reorganized Foreign
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Russia's National Interest and Threats to its Security, supra note 19, at 14.
31. The Russian Parliament is composed of the State Duma (lower house) and the Federa-
tion Counsel (Upper House).




Intelligence Service, and he retained this post in Yeltsin's government,
virtually the only holdover from the Gorbachev team.
Expressing his foreign policy ideas in his first press conference as
foreign minister in January 1996, Primakov unmistakably allied himself
with the "pragmatic nationalist" and "Eurasianist" viewpoints. He de-
clared that "Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy
toward the outside world should correspond to that status," while echoing
his predecessor in saying that Russia's policy should create "an environ-
ment that would, to the greatest extent possible, be favorable to the de-
velopment of the economy and the continuation of democratic processes
in Russian society.
The relations with Russia's former Cold-War adversaries, he empha-
sized, must be an "equitable and mutually advantageous partnership that
takes each other's interests into account."3 Expressing the need to "di-
versify" Russia's foreign ties, he made special mention of the Middle
East and the key states of Asia (not coincidentally, the subjects of his
academic specialization). Primakov enumerated four foreign policy tasks
to be given top priority:
1. The creation of the best external conditions conducive to strength-
ening the territorial integrity of our state.
2. The strengthening of centripetal tendencies in the territory of the
former USSR. Naturally, this does not and cannot mean the rebirth of
the Soviet Union in the form in which it used to exist. The sovereignty
obtained by the republics is irreversible, but this does not negate the
need for reintegration processes, first of all in the economic field.
3. The stabilization of the international situation at the regional level.
We have achieved great successes in the stabilization of the interna-
tional situation at the global level, having jointly won-I want to put
special emphasis on the point that there were no victors or vanquished
here-jointly won the cold war. Now things depend on the settlement
of regional, nationality-based, interethnic and interstate conflicts. Rus-
sian foreign policy will do everything possible to settle such conflicts,
first of all in the CIS and in the Yugoslav crisis.
4. The development of fruitful international relations that will prevent
the creation of new hotbeds of tension, and especially the proliferation
34. Primakov Starts with the CIS, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Feb. 7,
1996, at 11 (condensing and translating from original transcript of press conference appear-
ing in MOSKOVSKIlE Novosn, Jan. 14, 1996 at 13).
35. Jd.
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of means or weapons of mass destruction ... 36
In a later interview, Primakov, repeating the formula that "Russia
doesn't have permanent enemies, but ... it does have permanent inter-
ests," described these four tenets as Russia's "permanent interests. 37
Looking ahead to the future state of international relations, he foresaw a
world fifty years hence in which the concept of "balance of power"
would be different. "Then there won't be any question of who will bal-
ance whom or who will outweigh whom."38 Describing a process of in-
ternationalization, he concluded: "[t]here won't be any 'world govern-
ment,' and states will maintain their sovereignty, but everyone will be so
closely connected by production and the economy that it will be hard to
speak of a division or balance of power or the other things we've grown
accustomed to hearing. ' ' 9
A generation older than Kozyrev, Primakov proved to be a more ex-
perienced manager of the foreign ministry and a more adept politician.
The liberal press characterized him as a "moderate reformer," with a
steady style and immense organizational talent, who "appears to person-
ify a relative foreign policy consensus. 4 ° One article quoted Yakovlev's
declaration that Primakov, though "not a conservative," would pursue a
policy that "will constantly remind the Americans of Russia's exis-
tence.' Primakov's relative immunity from the sharp criticism that had
plagued Kozyrev was due in no small part to the fact that the foreign pol-
icy ideas he expressed found support among broad segments of the Rus-
sian political elite, while his assertiveness in promoting Russia's national
interests seemed to restore a measure of pride in Russian foreign policy.
B. Foreign Policy-Making under Yeltsin: The Institutional Context
1. Presidential Dominance
When Yeltsin issued a decree in the week following the attempted
coup banning the communist party, there was no longer an effective
mechanism at the center for directing and coordinating foreign policy. As
36. Id. at 11-12.
37. A Minister the Opposition Doesn't Curse, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS,
Oct. 23, 1996, at 22 (excerpting and translating from original article appearing in
OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, Sept. 19, 1996, at 4).
38. Id. at 23.
39. Id.
40. Yevgeny Primakov Goes Solo, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 2,
1996, at 25 (condensing and translating from Aleksei Pushkov's original article appearing in
MOSKOVSKIYE NOvOs'n, Sept. 8, 1996, at 5).
41. The Dark Glasses Keep One from Seeing the Minister's True Face, CURRENT DIG. OF
THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, June 12, 1996, at II (condensing and translating from Leonid
Mlechin's original article appearing in IZVESTIIA, May 15, 1996, at 6).
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a substitute, Yeltsin sought to augment the powers of his own office to
assume this central role in foreign policy making. Initially, this entailed a
struggle for power with parliament. The earlier, Soviet-era constitution of
the Russian republic (written in 1978 and-though much amended in its
last year-continuing in force until 1993) gave the Russian parliament
the formal right to determine the main lines of foreign policy and approve
ministerial appointments. But efforts by the legislative body in 1992 and
1993 to turn this formal power into reality were stubbornly resisted by
Yeltsin.
Presidential dominance of foreign policy became even more pro-
nounced in Yeltsin's Russian Federation than it had been in Gorbachev's
USSR, especially since the adoption of the new Constitution in 1993.
Articles 80 and 86 of this document give the president the power to exer-
cise leadership over "the conduct of the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation," within the framework of the constitution and laws of the
country.42 The formal or official powers of the Russian president under
the new constitution are greater than those of any previous Russian leader
since the tsar. Of course, unlike the tsar's powers, those of the president
have been granted by a vote of the Russian people.
Unlike its predecessor, the 1993 Constitution clearly gives the presi-
dent control of the government. In accordance with the Constitution and
federal laws, the president determines the basic guidelines of domestic
and foreign policy, serves as commander-in-chief and appoints and dis-
misses top commanders of the armed forces, approves military doctrine,
may declare martial law and states of emergency (with the approval of
the parliament's upper house, the Federation Council), and may issue
binding decrees and directives (providing they do not contradict the con-
stitution or federal law). Given these considerable powers, it is not sur-
prising that the president has a large staff, directed by the Head of Ad-
ministration, and several advisory bodies comprised of experts from in-
side and outside the government.
Yeltsin's direct role in foreign policy-making was further enhanced
by the fact that the foreign minister and the "power ministers" of Rus-
sia-the ministers of defense and interior, and the heads of the intelli-
gence and security services-report directly to the president, rather than
through the prime minister. With so many responsible officials having
direct access to the president-and given that Yeltsin's style, like the
former provincial party secretary that he is, was to keep his hands directly
in so many matters-it is not surprising that there has been an endemic
messiness in Russian foreign policy.
Yeltsin's creation of the Security Council in April 1992 was an at-
tempt to bring the top foreign policy and national security officials to-
42. KoNST RF. arts. 80, 86.
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gether to deliberate and prepare decisions for the president to implement
by decree. However, there was considerable variability in the Security
Council's effectiveness and priorities, depending in large part on the po-
litical ambitiousness of its Secretary, of whom there were nine in the
seven remaining years of Yeltsin's presidency. In late 1994, when the war
in Chechnya was launched, the Security Council, under the conservative
Oleg Lobov, was feared by liberals as the shadowy and powerful refuge
of the "party of war" that was exercising its sway over an enfeebled Yel-
tsin. Subsequently, during his brief tenure as Secretary in mid-1996,
Aleksandr Lebed sought to transform the Security Council into his per-
sonal vehicle for dominating not only security and defense policy, but
internal economic questions as well. On the whole, however, Yeltsin re-
sisted efforts to inflate the Council's authority and endow it with opera-
tional responsibility, evidently sensing that such a body-reminiscent of
the post-Stalinist Politburo-would dilute his own power.
During the early years of his presidency, Yeltsin attempted to lessen
the confusion arising from multiple centers of foreign policy-making by
issuing repeated decrees endowing the Foreign Ministry with a coordinat-
ing role. Only with Kozyrev's dismissal and the improvement Primakov
brought to the ministry in top-level organizational and political skill, was
the foreign ministry able to fulfill this coordinating role. Evidence of
Primakov's dominant role appeared in 1997, when Yeltsin decreed the
elimination of ten consultative bodies in his office, including the poten-
tially-troublesome Foreign Policy Council.
Yeltsin's preference for formal conceptual statements of guiding
principle, which resulted in the issuance of the foreign policy concept in
April 1993, also brought about the production of a new defense doctrine
in November 1993. On the whole, in its emphasis on mobile units and
peacekeeping responsibilities, especially in the CIS, the new Russian
military doctrine clearly envisaged the armed forces as an instrument of
the country's foreign policy. And by giving the professional military
leaders a major role in developing the political element of the doctrine-
as he did in a well-publicized meeting of the Security Council in Febru-
ary 1993-Yeltsin was underscoring the military's significant influence
on the formulation of national security policy. 43 But performance of the
Defense Ministry under General Pavel Grachev was generally miserable.
Yeltsin fired him in June 1996, naming as his successor Lebed's former
associate General Igor Rodionov. But the internal crisis in the military
continued, exacerbated by the memory of its inept and demoralizing per-
formance in Chechnya, until an angry Yeltsin publicly fired both Ro-
dionov and the Chief of General Staff Viktor Samsonov in May 1997.
43. Roy Allison, Military Factors in Foreign Policy, in INTERNAL FACTORS IN RUSSIAN
FOREIGN PoLIcy 255 (Neil Malcolm et al. eds., 1996).
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The new minister, General Igor Sergeev, was evidently more to the presi-
dent's liking; he played a highly visible role in the intensifying national
debate on the critical questions of further refining the military doctrine,
funding the armed forces budget and taking steps toward military reform.
Only two months after Sergeev's appointment, Yeltsin issued the
first decrees describing the proposed military reform. The total size of the
armed forces was to be cut by half a million, to 1.2 million; conscription
was eventually to be abolished but not by Yeltsin's original target date of
2000. Future annual military spending was to be limited to 3.5 percent of
GNP, down from a 1991 level of 7.2 percent. In the first stage of reduc-
tions, 300,000 civilian jobs were to be cut, and various activities not di-
rectly related to defense (such as road construction) were to be transferred
to civilian agencies. Expenses of the administrative apparatus of the de-
fense ministry were to be limited to one percent of the total defense
budget. There was no announced plan, however, to reduce the ratio of
officers to enlisted men from its current level of 1:1. The severely re-
duced defense budget is one element of the Yeltsin legacy that his suc-
cessor, Vladimir Putin, has already vowed to change.
Together with the military, the intelligence service is another
"power-wielding" institutional actor that regularly found a place at the
table when foreign policy decisions were made in the Soviet Union. It
continued to do so, without having undergone significant reform, in Yel-
tsin's Russia. The best available evidence on the role of the intelligence
and security services in post-Soviet Russia demonstrates that Yeltsin did
not truly curb the powers of these agencies, but rather chose to co-opt
their support, not only to perform foreign intelligence functions, but also
to assist him in his struggle against his political opponents. 4 The price he
paid for these services is that the successors to the KGB continue to play
a significant policy-making role. The dispersal of KGB functions into
five agencies and the dizzying succession of different names did not
really diminish the power of the security apparatus or disguise the fact
that most of its personnel were inherited from the KGB. That Yeltsin's
last three prime ministers (as well as his last three Security Council secre-
taries) were drawn from the ranks of the security services is itself striking
evidence of their continuing influence on the making of foreign policy.
Of course, Putin, one of the three on each list, personifies this continuing
prominence of the state security forces.
2. Parliamentary Influence on Yeltsin's Foreign Policy
On the whole, parliamentary influence on Russian foreign policy un-
der Yeltsin has been quite limited. If anything, its impact is more indirect
than direct, for by serving as a forum for the articulation of dissenting
44. See generally AMY KNIGHT, SPIES WITHOUT CLOAKS: THE KGB's SUCCESSORS (1996).
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opinions that are widely shared among politicians and elements of the
public, parliament helps shape the political climate in which executive
decisions must be made and may thereby influence the tone and tactics,
as opposed to the basic directions, of foreign policy.45 Viewed in this re-
spect, it is possible to conclude that a major change in the conduct of for-
eign policy that began in the latter period of Gorbachev's rule and con-
tinued in the Yeltsin years is the opening of the policy process to wider
participation and greater public visibility. Prior to the initiation of glas-
nost by Gorbachev, extreme secrecy was the norm in the decision-making
processes of the USSR, and sensitive foreign policy issues were discussed
and decided by relatively few high-ranking officials within the top lead-
ership. Public discussion, even in parliamentary forums, took the form of
after-the-fact justification and ratification of decisions, the basis for
which was rarely if ever discussed with completeness and candor. To a
limited extent during Gorbachev's last year or two in office, and to a
much greater degree in Yeltsin's democratizing Russia, the foreign policy
debate became more public and more open to the participation of a vari-
ety of groups representing more diverse viewpoints.
The greater openness of the political process in Russia and the re-
quirement that political elites engage in genuine electoral competition,
has made policy-makers pay more attention than ever before to public
opinion on international issues. But Russia is still far from being a ma-
ture, functioning democracy, and the channels through which public atti-
tudes are transmitted into the political process are in their infancy. Politi-
cal parties in particular remain insufficiently developed as organizations
to have any major impact on foreign policy. While the opposition parties
that dominated the Dumas elected in 1993 and 1995-Zhirinovsky's Lib-
eral Democratic Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federa-
tion-attempted to capitalize on the public's confusion about Russia's
national identity and its sense of national humiliation, surveys showed the
public to be less nationalistic and less favorable to the use of force than
are the party elites. Moreover, election polls showed that there was a
wide variety of foreign policy viewpoints among each party's voters,
making it extremely difficult to predict a voter's party choice on the basis
of his attitudes about Russia's external relations.46
Similarly, interest groups in Russia are poorly organized and frag-
mented. While it is possible to identify certain economic interests with
particular policy preferences-for example, defense industrialists with
45. See generally Alex Pravda, The Public Politics of Foreign Policy, in INTERNAL
FACTORS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 169-229 (Neil Malcolm et al. eds., 1996).
46. See id. at 188-203; Jack Snyder, Democratization, War, and Nationalism in the Post-
Communist States, in THE SOURCES OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 36
(Celeste A. Wallender ed., 1996).
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protectionism and higher defense spending-studies of the lobbying ac-
tivities of interest groups have concluded that there has been limited ef-
fectiveness.47 However, the growing importance of campaign funding by
large banks and corporations, as demonstrated by the 1996 presidential
elections, and the subsequent increased acquisition of print and broadcast
media outlets by major banking and energy interests, were evidence of a
heightening influence of business interests on the policy-making process.
Yeltsin's close association with Boris Berezovskii, the most infamous of
the Russian oligarchs-and the one most open in his "king-making" aspi-
rations-symbolized the continuing hold that Russian financial-industrial
"clans" had on the highest levels of political influence during the Yeltsin
years.
Russia's history of strong executive leadership, perpetuated in the
1993 constitution, with the extensive powers it gives to the president,
together with the rudimentary development of parties and interest groups,
make the personal attitudes and political skill of the top leader and his
closest associates of particular importance. This factor should have pro-
duced a strong and coherent vision for Russian foreign policy, smoothly
and effectively implemented. That it has not done so is, at least in part,
the result of several important internal features of Russian politics. In a
sense, foreign policy has become hostage to the two types of bitter politi-
cal struggles that Russia has endured in its first years of independence.
3. Political Struggles Affecting Yeltsin's Foreign Policy
The most visible realm of political struggle, that between Yeltsin and
his parliamentary and political opponents, was able to affect foreign pol-
icy primarily because of the openings created by the second realm: the
messy struggles within the government itself. And clearly, the greatest
impact of these influences from outside the executive branch was on
those issues of foreign policy relating to the "near abroad," the former
republics of the USSR that so suddenly became objects of foreign rather
than domestic policy. But even in this realm, one major study concluded
"the fitful incursions of other political forces into foreign policy have
accentuated its meanderings more than they have altered its overall direc-
tion. 48
Ironically, it was in the realm of internecine political conflict-the
47. See Kimberly Marten Zisk, The Foreign Policy Preferences of Russian Defense Indus-
trialists: Integration or Isolation?, in THE SOURCES OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE
COLD WAR, 95-120 (Celeste A. Wallender ed., 1996); Matthew Evangelista, From Each
According to its Abilities: Competing Theoretical Approaches to the Post-Soviet Energy
Sector, in THE SOURCES OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 173-205
(Celeste A. Wallender ed., 1996).
48. Alex Pravda & Neil Malcolm, Conclusion, in IN'TERNAL FACTORS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN
POLICY 286 (Neil Malcolm et al. eds., 1996)
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unceasing struggles for power and allegiance within Yeltsin's own top
entourage-that the greatest impact on foreign policy was felt. Clearly,
the president's personality and political style encouraged this political
infighting. The constant cabinet realignments and bureaucratic reorgani-
zations, the creation of one after another coordinating councils, the end-
less procession of ministers and advisers contributed greatly to the lack of
clarity and coherence in Russian foreign policy. While Yeltsin's fragile
health and his personal habits accentuated these tendencies, at root was
his failure to articulate his own clear and consistent vision of Russia's
national interests and to enforce sufficient discipline on his own govern-
ment team to translate this vision into effective policy.
II. THE YELTSIN LEGACY ABROAD
A. Russia and the "Near Abroad": The Commonwealth of Independent
States
The one realm of foreign policy in which Yeltsin did not himself in-
herit a legacy from Gorbachev was in Russia's relations with the former
Soviet republics. What had for centuries been a matter of domestic policy
for Moscow overnight became a foreign policy challenge of the greatest
immediacy. Together with the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus, Yeltsin
had created the CIS, to which the new states of Central Asia, the Cauca-
sus and Moldova eventually acceded. Yet this strange organization-
neither a confederation nor an economic union nor a security pact-was
clearly intended, at least by some of the leaders, as a mere fig-leaf behind
which the Soviet divorce would take place. While understanding the need
to reassure Soviet military leaders that security needs would not be over-
looked, Ukraine in particular wanted no central institutions (much less a
centralized military) for the CIS, lest they become levers for Moscow's
use in reclaiming its imperial hegemony.
Initially, Yeltsin treated the CIS as an instrument of Russian foreign
policy in two ways. It served as a means of coordination of policies
among its members, while he also saw it as a mechanism for asserting
Russian hegemony over the other eleven states. Yeltsin pursued both
goals simultaneously, initially giving prominence to the former. But with
the passage of time the latter became an important feature of Yeltsin's
policy. According to the text of the original agreement, the members
agreed to coordinate foreign policy activities. They specifically commit-
ted themselves to creating a "common military-strategic space" under a
joint commander, including a unified control over nuclear weapons.49
That commitment along with an agreement to create a "common eco-
49. CIS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 6, at 144.
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nomic space""0 was abandoned within two years.
In the absence of a joint nuclear command, Yeltsin set about to take
control over nuclear weapons. This decision, which took several years to
implement, was made possible in part with the strong financial and politi-
cal support of the United States. When the CIS was created, nuclear
weapons were deployed in four states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. The latter three states committed themselves in principle to rid-
ding their territory of all nuclear weapons, but when Ukraine soon found
itself enmeshed in a series of contentious issues with Russia, President
Leonid Kravchuk balked at the idea of turning strategic nuclear weapons
over to Russia. Despite the personal intervention of President Clinton, not
until Kravchuk was replaced by Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine's 1994 elec-
tions was the agreement for Ukraine's denuclearization sealed.
For his part, Yeltsin faced pressure from nationalist forces in the
Duma and elsewhere demanding territorial concessions from Ukraine in
the Crimea and an assertive stand on the division of the Black Sea Fleet
and its base at Sevastopol. Following his reelection in 1996 and the im-
provement of his health in 1997, Yeltsin was able to reassert his execu-
tive authority. Though on many foreign policy issues the hard-line na-
tionalists of the State Duma mirrored their predecessors in the Supreme
Soviet, Yeltsin's increased political clout in 1997, together with the
strong powers over foreign policy under his tailor-made constitution,
permitted the Russian president to override domestic opposition and
come to terms with Ukraine. A compelling motive for him to do so was
the movement within NATO to expand into Eastern Europe. Russia's
leverage against the powerful forces of NATO was meager, but one in-
strument to bolster its defense was to strengthen the weak bonds between
the two Slavic states.
This Yeltsin did in the spring of 1997. In late May an accord was
finally reached on the Black Sea Fleet. For appropriate compensation
Russia was permitted to station its portion of the Black Sea Fleet at the
port of Sevastopol for twenty years. This accord set the stage for Presi-
dent Yeltsin to make his first visit to Kiev, where he and Leonid Kuchma
signed a treaty of friendship. Moscow agreed to write off most of
Ukraine's huge oil debt to Russia. At the ceremony Yeltsin publicly ob-
served, "[w]e respect and honor the territorial integrity of Ukraine."'"
Formally, good relations were affirmed, but in both countries suspicions
50. Id. art. 7, at 144-45.
51. RADIO FREE EUR.IRADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH REPORT, Jan. 4, 1992, at 52. For discus-
sion of the military issues, see Stephen Foye, The CIS Armed Forces, RADIO FREE
EUR.IRADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH REPORT, Jan. 1, 1993, at 41; Stephen Foye, End of the CIS
Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY
RESEARCH REPORT, July 2, 1993, at 45.
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remained regarding the ultimate intentions of the other.
While Yeltsin's moderate leadership was important in producing
compromise agreements with Ukraine that displeased Russia's hardliners,
it was also important in restraining a joint movement of empire re-
builders in both Russia and Belarus, who pressed for reunification of the
two states as a first step in reconstituting a wider union. Yeltsin's objec-
tives were much more limited; he wanted legal authorization to station
Russian troops on Belarusian territory. This he received in a treaty on
cooperation and friendship signed on April 12, 1994, and ratified in April
of the following year by the Belarusian Parliament. But Belarussian
President Aleksandr Lukashenko wanted much closer economic relations,
to bolster his own weak economy, and on this issue Moscow was hesi-
tant. The Belarusian economy was in such bad shape that integration
could only end up as a burden on Russia; moreover, Belarus remained a
command economy resistant to economic reform. Consequently, Yeltsin
resisted the lifting of trade barriers and rejected plans for a monetary or
customs union between the two countries. 2 Lukashenko's suppression of
the media at home and the increasingly authoritarian nature of his ad-
ministration, not to mention a mercurial pattern of behavior, put off many
in Russia who were trying to nurture a fledgling democracy. But under
pressure from Ziuganov in his re-election campaign, Yeltsin agreed in
April 1996 to sign a vague treaty creating a "Community of Sovereign
Republics" with Belarus. But, he continued to resist meaningful steps
toward reunion throughout his second term, despite the tempting prospect
that a merged entity could give Yeltsin an opportunity to gain an addi-
tional presidential term. Continuing pressure from Lukashenko and Rus-
sian nationalists produced a second treaty, on the "Creation of a Union
State of Russia and Belarus," signed by the two presidents and ratified by
Russia's parliament just days before Yeltsin's resignation. Again, how-
ever, it was widely conceded to be so vague as to be without concrete
meaning.53
A strong core of Russian opinion, both elite and mass, supports the
idea of greater integration among the former Soviet republics. That opin-
ion is matched by similar views among a portion of the populations of
some of the CIS states, particularly in Central Asia. But among all of the
newly independent states (with the exception of Belarus) there is a strong
determination to preserve the independence and sovereignty won in 1991.
52. See Ustina Markus, Business as Usual with Lukashenka, TRANSITION, May 26, 1995,
at 57; Missed Opportunities in Foreign Policy, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH
REPORT, Aug. 25, 1995, at 62.
53. See Treaty on a Treaty, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 5, 2000, at 13
(condensing and translating Yury Chubchenko's original article appearing in KOMMERSANT,
Dec. 9, 1999, at 1), available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
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Although Boris Yeltsin shared this goal of greater integration and the
extension of Russia's hegemony over the former empire, he showed a
preference for diplomacy over coercion in the quest for satisfying Rus-
sia's needs in the "near abroad." What tactics his successor will choose
remains an open question.
B. Russia and the West
1. A Changed Orientation
One can only speculate how far rapprochement between Moscow
and the West would have gone had Gorbachev remained in office. By
negotiating far-reaching strategic and conventional arms control agree-
ments, terminating costly Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts,
and allowing the peaceful liquidation of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev had revolutionized East-West
relations. It is plain, however, that Gorbachev's successor, Boris Yeltsin,
aimed to go beyond rapprochement with the United States. He began his
administration with a genuine attempt to build a partnership with the
United States. During the first months of 1992, Yeltsin, and especially
Kozyrev, actively trumpeted the "Atlanticist" position. The Russian
president stated his views at a special summit meeting of the United Na-
tions Security Council on January 31, 1992:
Russia sees the U.S., the West, and the couraries of the East not
merely as partners but as allies. This is a highly important prerequisite
for, and, I would say, a revolution in, peaceful cooperation among the
states of the civilized world. We rule out any subordination of foreign
policy to ideological doctrines or a self-sufficient policy. Our princi-
ples are simple and understandable: the supremacy of democracy, hu-
man rights and liberties, legality, and morality.
5 4
Before a joint session of the U.S. Congress in June 1992, Yeltsin reaf-
firmed Russia's "responsibility for the success of our changes.., toward
... the entire world." 55
But clearly there was more than ideology or perceptions involved.
Russia was impelled by its domestic condition to seek outside assistance,
and no country was better positioned to aid the new administration than
the United States. Yeltsin made transformation of Russia's economy his
54. Ready to Continue Partnership, CuRRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 4,
1992, at 11 (condensing and translating Yeltsin's Speech at the U.N. Security Council Meet-
ing on Jan. 31, 1992, originally appearing in Ross. GAZETA, Feb. 3, 1992, at 1), available in
LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
55. Excerpts from Yeltsin's Speech: "There will be no more lies", N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1992, at A18.
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number one domestic priority. In an extraordinary speech in October
1991, Yeltsin discussed at length and in detail the need for Western assis-
tance and cooperation, and he even promised to give the West whatever
information it would want to facilitate aid.56
Western support for Yeltsin had an importance beyond economics. It
was also important for him politically. Yeltsin understood that he could
count on the support of Washington when he confronted domestic reac-
tion. The value of this support became clearly evident during the failed
coup of August 199 L" And later during the parliamentary crisis in Octo-
ber 1993, Yeltsin sought and received support from the United States.5 8 In
sum, the shift in Russian foreign policy toward a pro-Western orientation
reflected conviction, necessity and self-interest.
In the initial period after the collapse of the USSR, President Yeltsin
and Foreign Minister Kozyrev pursued the effort to "join the West" as the
highest priority of Russian foreign policy, making no particular differen-
tiation among the democratic market societies and associated interna-
tional institutions whose partnership they sought. Like Gorbachev before
them, they knocked on many doors, concluding treaties of friendship and
cooperation with individual Western states, obtaining membership for
Russia in that most exclusive of Western "clubs," the G7, and pursuing
opportunities to cooperate with (and ultimately join) selective organiza-
tions such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Paris Club,
and the London Club, as well as broader financial associations such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
Yeltsin also altered Russia's strategic posture. For the first time since
the beginning of the nuclear arms race, Russia abandoned its goal of par-
ity with the United States. "We are departing from the ominous parity,"
Yeltsin explained, "where each country was exerting every effort to stay
in line, which has led to Russia ... having half of its population living
below the poverty line."59 He acknowledged that Russian concessions
were made to give tangible "expression of the fundamental change in the
political and economic relations between the United States of America
56. DONALDSON & NOGEE, supra note 6, at 190 (citing B.N. Yeltsin's Speech,
SOVETSKAIA ROSSIIA, Oct. 29, 1991).
57. Andrei Kozyrev claimed that during the crisis "the Western embassies in effect began
to work for us: through them, we received and passed on information." JOHN DUNLOP, THE
RISE OF RUSSIA AND THE FALL OF THE SOvIET EMPIRE 216 (1993).
58. In his autobiography Yeltsin states that as the coup unfolded, "George Bush not only
called but immediately organized international support for Russia .... [H]is support was
invaluable." BORIS YELTSIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR RUSSIA 132 (1994).




and Russia.""° START II was agreed upon at the June 1992 summit and
signed on January 3, 1993.61
In the first phase of Yeltsin's rule, Russia's Western orientation ex-
tended to cooperation on issues where its interests had historically di-
verged, such as in the growing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Though
sympathetic to the Serbian cause, the Russian government condemned
Serbian atrocities as well as Yugoslav support for Bosnian Serb aggres-
sion. Russia, notwithstanding its dislike of coercion against the Serbs,
supported resolutions in the United Nations authorizing the use of force,
if necessary. The Russian delegate to the Security Council made no effort
to use the power of the veto to prevent the expulsion of Yugoslavia from
the United Nations.62 The Yeltsin administration was careful to avoid
drifting too far from the mainstream of international opinion on Yugosla-
via and Bosnia.
2. Russia's Shift to the Right
For about two years the Yeltsin administration maintained a pro-
Western orientation in the conduct of foreign policy. Russian-American
summits in 1992 and 1993 demonstrated an unprecedented rapport be-
tween the leaderships of the two countries. At the Washington summit of
June 1992, Yeltsin and Bush signed a Charter of Russian-American Part-
nership and Friendship affirming "the indivisibility of the security of
North America and Europe" and a common commitment to "democracy,
the supremacy of law ... and support for human rights. 63 In Vancouver,
Canada, Yeltsin and President Clinton agreed to create a Russian-
American Commission on Questions of Technology (popularly known as
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission for its co-chairmen). In Canada,
Yeltsin received a pledge of an immediate assistance package of $1.6
billion, and the Paris Club granted Russia a ten-year deferral of its debt
obligations due in 1993.
However, both in the parliament and in non-government circles, Yel-
tsin was attacked by nationalists for his support of U.S. policy in Yugo-
60. Id.
61. See Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3,
1993, U.S.-Russian Federation, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-1 (1993).
62. See Dangerous Precedent: Yugoslavia Expelled from U.N., CURRENT DIG. OF THE
POST-SOVIT PRESS, Oct. 21, 1992, at 20 (translating Vladislav Drobkov's original article
appearing in PRAVDA, Sept. 24, 1992, at 3). See also Russian Delegation Saves London Con-
ference, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Sept. 30, 1992, at 16 (condensing and
translating Yelena Shchedrunova's original article appearing in NEZAVISIMAYA, Aug. 29,
1992, at 1) (discussing the efforts of the Russian Delegation at the London Conference as a
triumph for Russian diplomacy).
63. DONALDSON & NOGEE, supra note 6, at 197 (citing Ross. GAzETA, June 19, 1992, at
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slavia and for such actions as the 1993 U.S. air strike against Iraq. Pravda
chided Yeltsin, saying, "[t]he role of Washington 'yes-man' is unbecom-
ing of any country, especially Russia, and it inevitably conflicts with na-
tional interests."' Andrei Kozyrev served as a lightning rod for much of
the criticism of the administration. The Supreme Soviet called in vain for
his removal.
For Boris Yeltsin these pressures imposed a careful balancing strat-
egy. His record as a whole justifies the conclusion that his commitment to
partnership with the West reflected a genuine conviction. And indeed,
though there were significant swings in Russian foreign policy over the
course of Yeltsin's two terms, the underlying rationale never changed.
But to understand the swings it is necessary to consider both Yeltsin's
political calculations and the evolving political and economic conditions
within Russia.
Certainly a factor in the evolution of Russia's policy was popular
disillusionment with the fruits of economic reform. "Shock therapy," be-
gun in January 1992, led to severe economic hardship for millions of or-
dinary people. By virtually every economic index, production declined
during the early post-Soviet years. Economic assistance from the United
States proved to be disappointingly smaller than most Russians expected.
Those critical of Yeltsin to begin with belittled American aid. "For a year
and a half," noted Pravda after the Vancouver summit, "we have been
fed cock-and-bull stories about the inevitable 'rain of gold' from the West
to back up Yeltsin's reforms."65 Nor was disillusionment with American
aid limited to hardened anti-Yeltsinites. In late 1993 polls showed that by
a two-to-one margin Russians were convinced that the West's economic
advice represented a deliberate effort to weaken Russia. This margin in-
creased in 1995 and 1996.66
Yeltsin's own views changed with those of the electorate. To say this
is not to suggest that Yeltsin shifted with the fluctuating winds of public
opinion as measured by polls. But as president, he felt an obligation to be
"comprehensible, controllable, and dependent upon public opinion."6Al-
though he frequently demonstrated a pronounced tendency toward au-
thoritarianism, on other notable occasions he found reason to compromise
with his critics and opponents. As the broad contours of public opinion
shifted, so did Yeltsin. This could be viewed either as political expedi-
ency or as.the democratic response of a leader to his people.
64. Id. (citing PRAVDA, Jan. 27, 1993, at 1).
65. Id. (citing PRAVDA, Apr. 6, 1993, p. 3).
66. See JERRY F. HOUGH, DEMOCRATIZATION AND REVOLUTION IN THE USSR: 1985-1991
519 (1997).
67. YELTSIN, supra note 58, at 288.
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3. War and Peace in Bosnia
Russia's shift toward a more nationalistic foreign policy produced in
Moscow a stronger defense of the Serbs in their war against the Muslims
and Croats in Bosnia. In the face of Western pressure to assist the Mus-
lim-controlled government of Bosnia, Russia successfully blocked efforts
in the United Nations to have the arms embargo in Bosnia lifted. It also
strenuously opposed military intervention by the West. Yeltsin's inclina-
tion to support the Serbs, however, was curbed by his determination to
avoid drifting too far from the mainstream of international opinion. He
thus supported Western political initiatives to negotiate a settlement of
the war, such as the 1993 Vance-Owen Plan.
Yeltsin found it increasingly difficult to hold off Western action in
the face of the 1994-95 escalation of Bosnian Serb atrocities and attacks
on various UN "safe havens." Under continuous pressure from Duma
nationalists, Yeltsin pressured Serbia's president Milosevic to restrain his
Bosnian Serb allies, while proposing a series of diplomatic initiatives. In
August-September 1995, a combination of a successful Croatian offen-
sive against Serb-held Krajina and devastating NATO air strikes pro-
duced a ceasefire and an agreement by all parties to meet for peace talks
in the United States. In direct talks with President Clinton, Yeltsin
achieved a face-saving Russian role in the enforcement of the resulting
Dayton Accords.68
4. NATO Expansion
In Russia's relations with the West, the biggest issue of contention in
the post-Dayton period became the proposal to expand NATO to include
former members of the Warsaw Pact. Of the many issues related to
NATO expansion, the most general and fundamental concerned what
type of system of European security would replace the alliance structure
of the Cold War period. From Yeltsin's perspective, the basic question
was how Russia would fit into a system of European security. Would it
be accepted as a great power, or simply as another European state?
Would it be viewed as a partner or as a potential adversary? And what
institutional mechanism would govern decision-making for security is-
sues in Europe?
For nearly all Russians, NATO was stigmatized by the history of the
Cold War and was viewed as an adversarial organization. Russian politi-
cal elites much preferred as a mechanism for European security the more
politically neutral Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
But there was more involved in the expansion of NATO than just vital
68. The plan called for Russian troops participating in Bosnian peacekeeping operations to
report to a U.S. general rather than to NATO's commander. See DONALDSON & NOGEE,
supra note 6, at 211.
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national interests. National prestige was also an important consideration.
Russia has yet to come to terms with its loss of status as a superpower.
Indeed, many Russians question whether their country can even be
ranked as a "great power." An expansion of the military alliance which
played a vital role in the defeat of the Soviet Union was viewed by many
as rubbing the Soviet defeat in the Russian nose-a national humiliation.
Although Boris Yeltsin had spoken favorably of Poland's interest in
NATO during a visit to Warsaw in the summer of 1993, he quickly re-
versed himself under pressure from members of his administration, par-
ticularly the military. Just before the parliamentary elections in December
1993, Yevgeny Primakov, then director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence
Service, issued a blistering critique of NATO expansion. He noted that
historically NATO and the former Soviet Union had viewed each other as
enemies and that "this psychological mind-set cannot be broken
painlessly. '69 An expansion of NATO to Russia would create a "new
geopolitical situation that is extremely disadvantageous to Russia."'" This
would lead Russia to rethink its defense concepts and restructure its
armed forces.
Nevertheless, intensive negotiations in the spring of 1997 were con-
ducted to obtain Russian acceptance of the inevitable. Moscow dropped
its demand that a NATO-Russian Charter take the form of a legally bind-
ing treaty, accepting in its place an executive agreement. On May 27,
1997, Boris Yeltsin and Javier Solana signed the "Founding Act on Mu-
tual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Rus-
sian Federation."71 This act created a NATO-Russian Council that would
meet periodically to consider security problems as they arose in Europe.
The Council would operate by consensus, but NATO remained free to act
without Council approval. As a concession to the Russians, NATO stated
that it had "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to deploy nuclear weap-
ons on the territories of its new members or to significantly increase troop
levels on their territories.7 3 Now foreign minister, Primakov put the best
face possible on the pact, calling it a "big victory for Russia," but in a
television interview on the night of the signing Yeltsin acknowledged that
Russia "was playing a weak hand."74 In July NATO invited the Czech-
69. Is an Expansion of NATO Justified?, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PREss, Dec.
22, 1993, at 11, 12 (condensing and translating Andrei Poleshchuk's original article appear-
ing in NEZAVISIMAYA, Nov. 26, 1993, at 1, 3.)
70. Id.
71. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1006.
72. See id. art. II, at 1010.
73. See id. art. IV, at 1013.
74. Michael R. Gordon, Decision for NATO: The Overview; Russia Agrees to NATO Plan
Pushed by Clinton to Admit Nations from Eastern Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at A8.
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Republic, Poland and Hungary to apply to become members.
These invitations did not end the issue as a bone of contention be-
tween Russia and the West. It marked only a new stage in the Russian
struggle to contain NATO. At Madrid, Western spokesmen made clear
their intention to go beyond the first three invitations. Madeleine Albright
specifically promised Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that they would be
future candidates for membership. In reply, a spokesman at Russia's Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs replied:
we are put on guard by the Madrid declaration's mention of the states
in the Baltic region, a reference that, although indirect, nevertheless
was in the context of prospects for further NATO expansion. I want to
emphasize once again that such a decision has been and remains unac-
ceptable to Russia.75
5. Russia and Europe
No event since the end of the Cold War has symbolized the new
world order more than the expansion of NATO. For Russia it was a major
blow to its national prestige. Quarrels were erupting with the United
States over policy in Bosnia, continuing American trade restrictions, and
Russia's planned weapons exports to anti-American regimes which led to
complaints about America's "hegemonic" behavior. Particularly after the
outbreak of war in Chechnya, Russia's relations with the EU soured and
its progress toward membership in the Council of Europe slowed, accen-
tuating Moscow's growing isolation and stimulating tendencies to play
Western states off against one another. By the end of 1997, Yeltsin was
talking openly in European capitals about the need to reduce American
influence in "our Europe."
Yeltsin's last foreign trip of 1997 was a highly publicized visit to
Sweden, notable less for its diplomatic achievements than for several em-
barrassing mistakes made by the Russian president that underscored his
declining ability to serve as a credible spokesman for Russia's interests.
At one point, Yeltsin evidently believed he was in Finland; on another
occasion, he referred to an oil deal that had actually been concluded with
Norway. Blurting out a confusing offer for a unilateral reduction in nu-
clear arms-later disavowed by his staff-he mistakenly identified Ger-
many and Japan as nuclear powers. In this context, observers were uncer-
tain of the status of a declaration he made in a speech to the Swedish par-
liament-later confirmed by his defense minister and evidently intended
75. Madrid is the Last Thing We Needed, CuRRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Aug.
13, 1997, at 2 (condensing and translating materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry's
Department of Information and the Press originally appearing in ROSS. GAZETA, July 11,
1997, at 4), available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
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to reassure the Baltic states that their membership in NATO would be
unnecessary-promising a forty percent cut in Russian forces along the
country's northwestern border by 1999. In any event, Yeltsin's strange
behavior was later blamed by his staff on fatigue and a developing cold,
and he was hospitalized upon his return to Russia.
More diplomatically significant, and symbolic of the growing differ-
entiation that had occurred in Russian policy toward the West, was a trip
Yeltsin made a little earlier in the fall of 1997, to a summit meeting of the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The Russian president seemed at pains
to underscore the extent to which Russia regarded itself as part of a
Europe that was increasingly resistant to U.S. domination. "We do not
need an uncle from somewhere," he declared in an interview before the
summit, "[w]e in Europe are capable of uniting ourselves to live nor-
mally. 76 In addition to its fears that the United States was seeking to re-
divide Europe to its disadvantage through expansion of NATO, Moscow
resented continuing U.S. refusal to grant most favored nation trade status,
Congress' threats to cut off aid (regarded as niggardly in any event) in
retaliation for a parliamentary act regulating religious practice in Russia,
and Washington's announced intention to retaliate against Russia and
France for their cooperative project to develop gas fields in Iran.77 Within
a few weeks, Russia would again display this determined independence,
joining with France in resisting the tough American stance on UN sanc-
tions on Iraq. Moreover, in a move clearly aimed at emphasizing that his
main Western partners were in Europe, Yeltsin announced at Strasbourg
that he would hold annual summits with the French and German leaders
to review the state of the European continent.
What energies a declining Yeltsin had left in his final two years in
office were primarily engaged with internal political and economic trou-
bles. Many of these were his own making; he kept the political scene de-
stabilized by firing four prime ministers in the space of eighteen months!
In the midst of this turmoil, in August 1998, Russia's economy collapsed.
A currency devaluation and moratorium on payment of external debts
virtually destroyed opportunities for further credits or investments from
the West.
Through spring 1999, Russian foreign policy was personally guided
by Primakov, first as foreign minister, and then as prime minister. Even
after his ouster, his influence was felt through his former deputy, Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov. The steadily pronounced theme of Russian policy
during this period was resistance to perceived U.S. uni-lateralism and
insistence on restoration of a multi-polar world. Thus, for example, Rus-
76. DONALDSON & NOGEE, supra note 6, at 232.
77. See Kremlin Adopting a New Anti-American Line?, JAMESTOWN FOUND. MONITOR,
Oct, 20, 1997, in JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, Oct. 21, 1997.
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sia cooperated with France and China in resisting American and British
military operations in Iraq; it issued a joint statement with China oppos-
ing U.S.-requested modifications in the ABM treaty to permit Washing-
ton to develop a missile defense system; and it continued to resist Ameri-
can pressures to halt its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Although Yeltsin
and Primakov had agreed to obtain parliamentary ratification of the
START II treaty, votes were thrice postponed in the face of such demon-
strations of American "hegemonic" actions in defiance of Russia's inter-
ests.
6. Russia and the War in Kosovo
The greatest crisis in East-West relations in the Yeltsin era took
place in 1999 and resulted from a mixture of two volatile issues: the con-
tinuing crisis in the Balkans and the posture assumed by a newly-enlarged
NATO. Fresh on the heels of Western assurances that the role of the ex-
panded alliance was strictly defensive, the Russians were enraged when
NATO undertook a 78-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to
force its regime to grant autonomy to the Albanian majority in its Kosovo
province. The Kosovo war occasioned lusty anti-American protests
across the political spectrum in Russia; extremist nationalists stoked the
flames by organizing volunteer brigades and other forms of assistance for
"fraternal" Serbs.
When the bombing campaign not only failed to change the politics of
Yugoslavia's Milosevic, but resulted in a massive refugee crisis that
threatened to destabilize the entire region, NATO leaders sought to enlist
Russian diplomacy (in the persona of former premier Viktor Cherno-
myrdin) in bringing about a settlement. The deal he offered to Milosevic
was a compromise rather than a restatement of NATO's original terms.
Still insisting that the Western military alliance had no legal or moral
foundation for an act of military aggression against a sovereign state,
Russia had agreed to play the role of mediator only if the agreement
called for an international civil and security presence in Kosovo under the
auspices of the United Nations. By the terms of the agreement, the secu-
rity forces would have "substantial NATO participation," but the civil
administration in Kosovo would be under the direction of the U.N. Secu-
rity Council.7 8 But once NATO had obtained Russia's and China's U.N.
votes, it proceeded to act as though "substantial" participation in the
peacekeeping force meant an exclusive NATO operation.
Even as NATO's armies entered Kosovo, their triumph was clouded
by the unexpected prior arrival of a contingent of Russian peacekeeping
78. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 ith mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) (authorizing
an international "civil presence" in Kosovo with extensive powers to establish an interim
government).
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forces at the airport in Pristina. Initial claims that the move was a mistake
were negated when President Yeltsin promoted the commanding general.
The actual timing of the troop movements appeared to be an initiative
taken by the military leadership. They had been deeply angered by the
NATO bombing campaign and even more profoundly humiliated by
Moscow's key role in brokering Milosevic's agreement. In a startling
display of independence, Moscow's generals created "facts on the
ground" in order to force NATO's adherence to its own peace agreement.
As Moscow and other observers saw it, Milosevic's consent had
been obtained not simply by the force of NATO's bombs, but also by
Russia's promise that Serb residents and shrines would be safeguarded by
Moscow's own participation in peacekeeping. As NATO moved to freeze
them out, the Russian generals sought to preserve this objective with their
military preemption. But in the end the more moderate Yeltsin prevailed
on his generals to back down. The ultimate terms for Russian participa-
tion, negotiated with the United States in Helsinki, kept its forces under
Moscow's command, but denied Russia a peacekeeping zone of its own.
Needing economic concessions from the West and seeking to retain
surface harmony, the Russian president had again swallowed his pride
and backed away from outright confrontation. But the Yeltsin era was
nearing an end, with critical parliamentary and presidential elections
scheduled in Moscow in the coming year. Polls showed that only two
percent of Russian voters had confidence in Yeltsin, and that anti-
Americanism had exploded in the population since NATO's bombing
campaign.
It was not so much their traditional solidarity with Serbs, but outrage
over empty American assurances about expanded-NATO's purely defen-
sive role that united all of Russia's political factions against NATO's
war. The Clinton Administration's perceived unilateralism and its re-
peated refrain that America is "the indispensable nation" threatened to
revive Cold War attitudes in much of the Russian population. Later in the
year, when the United States and other Western nations urged a halt to
Moscow's renewed offensive against "banditry" in Chechnya, the Rus-
sians were outraged at the perceived double standard: their own protests
over a brutal bombing campaign against their traditional allies in Serbia
could be ignored by NATO nations, while Moscow's efforts to defend
itself against terrorism emanating from its southernmost province were
condemned. In Beijing on December 9, 1999, on his last foreign trip as
president, an angry Yeltsin added to his legacy this apparently spontane-
ous warning:
Yesterday Clinton permitted himself to put pressure on Russia. He
evidently forgot for a second, a minute, or half a minute just what
Russia is, and that Russia possesses a full arsenal of nuclear weapons.
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He forgot that.... It never has been and never will be the case that he
alone dictates to the world how to live, how to work, what sort of rec-
reation to have, and so on. No. I repeat, no! A multipolar world-
that's the basis of everything. That's what we agreed on with Jiang
Zemin.79
C. Russia and the "Non-West"
At least since the adoption of Russia's official foreign policy concept
by President Yeltsin in April 1993, top priority was given to the "near
abroad." Accordingly, the main objective of Russia's policy in the "non-
West" has been to ensure the security of the territories of the former So-
viet lands, insulating them from the harmful effects of such regional con-
flicts as the struggle for control of Afghanistan, or from threatening
movements such as Islamic extremism. Given the strategic nature of en-
ergy resources in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics, Russia has
tended to define its security interests in these areas to include preventing
outside powers from gaining leverage over these resources. Setting its
overall priorities in this way has pointed Russia toward East and South
Asia and the Middle East as the zones of greatest concern. These are also
the regions where there is the greatest danger of a broader but no less po-
tent threat to Russia's security interests-nuclear proliferation.
With the recent emphasis on the role of foreign policy as a contribu-
tor to economic development, it is not surprising that another major ob-
jective of Russia's policy toward the countries of the "non-West" is eco-
nomic. These regions constitute an enormous and growing market, where
Russian goods, be they raw or semi-processed materials, lower-quality
consumer goods, or the more sophisticated products of Russian science
and engineering, have a somewhat better chance of obtaining a competi-
tive advantage than they do in Western marketplaces. And imported
products from Asia, Africa and Latin America have potential benefit for
Russian manufacturers and consumers, especially if they are obtained in
partial payment of the enormous debts that some countries in these re-
gions have accumulated as a result of their transactions with the former
Soviet Union.
The combined total of debt owed to Russia by developing countries
was estimated in September 1997 at a staggering $112.7 billion (all but
$1 billion of which dated from the Soviet period). Of fifty-one debtor
nations, only India was currently repaying its debt in full. The largest
debts were owed to Russia by Cuba, Mongolia, India, and Vietnam. Mos-
cow's admission to the Paris Club of creditor nations put international
79. Yeltsin, in Beijing, Issues Warning to Clinton, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET
PRESS, Jan. 12, 2000, at 1 (translating Yeltsin's Statement), available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CDSP File.
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pressure on the debtors to repay. And while the Russians agreed to dis-
count the debt, in amounts ranging from thirty-five to eighty percent, the
repayments were to be made in hard currency. The effect, according to
then-First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, would be to triple the
volume of annual debt payments to the Russian government from devel-
oping countries.
Whereas prior to the end of the'Cold War, aid and trade transactions
between the Soviets and the Third World had been heavily subsidized by
Moscow for political reasons, cash-strapped Russia, forced to abandon
"soft" credit terms, found its goods far less attractive than they had been.
As a consequence, trade with most of the "non-West" in the immediate
post-Soviet period fell sharply. Reflecting these realities, Russia cut back
its costly overseas trade-promotion efforts, which were often a front for
espionage activities during the Soviet period. Whereas Moscow operated
130 organizationally-distinct trade missions abroad in 1991, the number
had been cut to forty-seven by 1996, with trade counselors in Russian
embassies taking over the responsibilities in the countries with less-
promising markets. As was the case during the Soviet period, Russia's
main export to the "non-West" in the Yeltsin years was weaponry, and a
major beneficiary of renewed activity in these regions was the underem-
ployed military-industrial complex of Russia.
1. Russia's Relations with China
As the country with which the Soviet Union shared its longest bor-
der, China, not surprisingly, occupied a higher foreign-policy priority for
Russia than any other non-Westem country, all the more so, given the
state of high tension on that border in recent decades. In this area, as in
relations with the West, the foundations for Yeltsin's policies were laid
by his predecessor. Gorbachev took steps in the late 1980s to address the
most serious issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and his efforts culminated
in his May 1989 trip to Beijing, which symbolized the end of the Cold
War between the two communist giants. But the Chinese were severely
displeased with the domestic political changes that Gorbachev was over-
seeing in the USSR, especially as Soviet democratization became a bea-
con for Chinese students, whose dissent was crushed on Tiananmen
Square just days after Gorbachev's visit. And although they had reached
an accord with Gorbachev's government on ninety-eight percent of their
border with the USSR in May 1991, the Chinese rulers barely disguised
their support for the coup that sought to topple the Soviet president in
August 1991.
In December 1992, Boris Yeltsin made a state visit to Beijing, and
the Russian delegation signed over twenty documents, among them, a
mutual promise not to enter into any military-political alliance directed
against the other state. The Chinese characterized the atmosphere of talks
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during Yeltsin's visit as "friendly, open and constructive . . . and in a
spirit of mutual respect, understanding and trust."80 The gradual escala-
tion of such rhetorical descriptions of presidential visits over the next
several years serves as a barometer of the changed atmospherics in the
Sino-Russian relationship, or, at any rate, of the way in which Moscow
and Beijing wanted the world to view it. Thus, Chinese President Jiang
Zemin's visit to Moscow in September 1994 was said to signify "rela-
tions . . . [of] a new quality," called by both countries a "constructive
partnership," although not an alliance and not aimed against any other
country."1 Yeltsin, during his visit to China in April 1996, described a
"partnership directed toward the twenty-first century' 82 between nations
of which there was "no other such pair in the world."83 And during Ji-
ang's April 1997 visit to Russia, the Russian president reached new rhe-
torical heights, describing the visit as one of "enormous, and perhaps
even historic, significance, inasmuch as we are determining the fate of the
twenty-first century."' Of the joint declaration signed by the two presi-
dents, Yeltsin declared: "never before has Russia signed such a document
with any other country., 85 Guests at the formal luncheon held during Yel-
tsin's November 1997 visit to Beijing witnessed not only a warm em-
brace but also singing by the two presidents. Observers could not recall
such a cordial atmosphere at prior Sino-Russian summits.86
Consistent with the Marxist-Leninist tradition, of which both presi-
dents were well aware, such phrase-mongering is not a casual exercise
but is calibrated to carry a distinct message. In this case, the message is
80. Yeltsin Visits Beijing for Talks, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 20,
1993, at 13 (condensing and translating Vasily Kononenko & Vladimir Skosyrev's original
article appearing in IZVESTuA, Dec. 21, 1992, at 4).
81. Partners, but not Allies, CuRRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 5, 1994, at 13
(condensing and translating Aleksandr Chudedeyev's original article appearing in
SEVODNYA, Sept. 2, 1994, at 3).
82. Visits: A Partnership Directed Toward the 21st Century, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SOVIET PRESS, May 22, 1996, at 6 (condensing and translating Pavel Shinkarenko's original
article appearing in Ross. VESTI, Apr. 26, 1996, at 1).
83. Boris Yeltsin Sees No One Who Could Stand Against Such a Pair as "Great Russia"
and "Great China", CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SoviET PRESS, May 22, 1996, at 7, 8 (trans-
lating and condensing Tatyana Malkina's original article appearing in SEVODNYA, Apr. 27, at
1).
84. A Breakthrough for Russian Policy on the Asian Front, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SOVIET PRESS, May 28, 1997, at 1 (condensing and translating original article appearing in
Ross. VESTI, Apr. 24, 1997, at 1), available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
85. Id.
86. See Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin Find Harmony, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVET
PRESS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 6 (condensing and translating Aleksandr Chudobeyev's original
article appearing in SEVODNYA, Nov. 10, 1997, at 4), available in LEXIS, News Library,
CDSP File.
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not solely or even primarily to be understood as a description of the ac-
tual state of relations between the two states, but rather as an indicator of
the extent of their mutual concern over the status and behavior of an-
other-the United States-and of their desire to send a warning to its
government. Both sides have been explicit in their opposition to "he-
gemonism"-the effort to build a unipolar international system. As Yel-
tsin put it in June 1997, "Someone is always dragging us toward a unipo-
lar world and wanting to dictate unilaterally, but we want multipolar-
ity."87 Such statements on the part of Russia were especially frequent af-
ter the United States announced its plans for expansion of NATO, and the
implied countermeasure-a "pairing" of "great Russia" and "great
China," as Yeltsin termed it in 1996-was intended to persuade NATO
not to undertake expansion or, at the very least, to place limits on it.8"
Although China also denounces NATO expansion as "a policy of blocs,"
Beijing is less directly affected by it, and is more concerned about its dif-
ferences with the United States on Taiwan, trade, and human rights.
During the Yeltsin years, bilateral relations between the two neigh-
bors were normalized on several fronts. Further progress was made in
1994 in demarcating the border, leaving stretches totaling less than ten
square miles (two islands near Khabarovsk and another in Chita prov-
ince) still under dispute. Both presidents confidently predicted during
Jiang's June 1997 visit to Moscow that these issues would be resolved in
1997, but Yeltsin faced very strong opposition to further concessions
from local authorities. Thus, when it was announced during Yeltsin's
November 1997 visit to China, his fifth summit with Jiang Zemin, that
the 4200-kilometer border had been demarcated for the first time in the
two nations' histories, the fine print on the agreement revealed continued
difficulties.8 9
The Sino-Russian trade relationship is a prime example of one in
which armaments constitute the single most important Russian export,
accounting for at least $5 billion in the last five years, and reportedly
comprising at least one-third of the $7 billion forward-order sales claimed
by Rosvooruzheniye, the Russian arms export agency, at the beginning of
1997.90 Combat aircraft have been the chief component of Russian deliv-
eries; China has purchased at least seventy-two transcontinental SU-27
fighters,91 which are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow trip in
two and one-half hours with one mid-air refueling. Other categories of
87. A Breakthrough for Russian Policy on the Asian Front, supra note 84.
88. See Boris Yeltsin Sees No One Who Could Stand Against Such a Pair as "'Great Rus-
sia" and "Great China ", supra note 83.
89. See Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin Find Harmony, supra note 86.
90. See Russia and China: Can a Bear Love a Dragon?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1997,
at 19, 20.
91. See id. at 20.
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purchases which have been concluded or which are being discussed in-
clude naval vessels (Sovremennyi-class destroyers equipped with super-
sonic missiles, two Kilo-636 diesel-powered submarines, and less ad-
vanced Varsha-vianka submarines), S-300 surface-to-air missile com-
plexes, T-72 tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology
for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for MIR-
Ved missiles. Left unresolved by Yeltsin was the significant question of
whether Russia was endangering its own long-term security by selling to
its giant neighbor its most advanced weapons and the know-how to pro-
duce them. Russian military sources have expressed envy that Beijing is
receiving more modem equipment than their own units possess. How-
ever, most Russian analysts appeared to believe that China's near-term
foreign policy ambitions are directed toward Taiwan and the South China
Sea, and that her interests in stability in Central Asia paralleled those of
Russia. Yeltsin and Primakov seemed to have calculated that they could
keep the relationship with China in check, utilizing it as a way of balanc-
ing U.S. influence in Asia. If China's military and economic power con-
tinue to grow and her territorial ambitions eventually turn back toward
the north and west, Yeltsin's successors may find greater safety in again
tilting the triangular balance by strengthening Russia's ties with the
United States.
2. Russia's Relations with Japan and South Korea
Despite the major effort Yeltsin made to normalize and strengthen
Russia's ties with China, he by no means put all his Far Eastern eggs in
the Chinese basket. Following again on Gorbachev's initiatives, Yeltsin
also sought to improve Russia's relations with two strong allies of the
United States-Japan and South Korea. He hoped that they would be ea-
ger investors in the development of Russia's vast far eastern mineral re-
serves. Russia also sought to play a role in regional security arrangements
that would foster stability and promote expanded trade. But neither To-
kyo nor Seoul responded to Yeltsin's overtures with the degree of enthu-
siasm for which he had hoped.
One reason that Japan's investment in the Russian Far East has been
less than anticipated (beyond its own recent economic difficulties) is un-
doubtedly Russia's continuing political instability, of which Japanese
investors are notoriously shy. But Japan would rather concentrate Mos-
cow's attention on another factor explaining its reticence: the continuing
absence, more than a half century after World War II, of a peace treaty
between Japan and Russia. The obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty is
the persisting dispute over the ownership of the southern Kurile Islands.
Yeltsin initially gave indications that he would be amenable to negotia-
tions for a settlement, but despite alleged Japanese financial promises, his
cash-starved government backed off after the prospect of territorial con-
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cessions became the object of angry debate among nationalists in the
Russian parliament.
No further progress was made until Yeltsin hosted Japan's Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto for an informal "weekend without neckties"
in November 1997 in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk.92 The two leaders
pledged "to make every effort" to conclude a peace treaty by 2000, based
on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration in which Yeltsin had acknowledged the
existence of a territorial dispute over the southern Kuriles.93 However,
members of his government downplayed the possibility that the islands
might eventually be surrendered, noting that the Russian Constitution
upholds the territorial integrity of the country, and the President is the
guarantor of the Constitution.94 Despite the lingering ambiguities, the
"sauna summit" was said by Yeltsin to have helped break the ice and
overcome mutual distrust, but with his early resignation, he left to his
successor the difficult task of actually resolving the issue in the year
2000.
3. Russia and the Middle East
The southward expansion of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries brought it into frequent conflict with the Otto-
man Empire and with Persia, as well as with the competing empires of
Britain and France. During the Soviet period, Lenin, Stalin, and their suc-
cessors engaged in active (and occasionally expansionist) diplomacy in
the region, as Moscow competed for territory and influence with the
countries of the Middle East and with Western "imperialism." And al-
though, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation now finds
itself geographically separated from the Middle East by the buffer states
of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Moscow's vital interests in these for-
mer Soviet republics and the vast energy reserves they contain-second
only to those of the Middle East itself-made the region a high priority
for Yeltsin's foreign policy.
The highest concern in the region is Turkey and Iran, the two states
that share a border with the states of the former Soviet Union and that are
thus seen as Russia's potential competitors there. Yeltsin's policies to-
ward them varied, in part as a result of the shifting political winds in
Moscow, with Westernizers and Eurasianists competing over the direc-
tion of foreign policy. But there was also variability in Moscow's percep-
tion of the threat that Ankara or Teheran was seeking to extend pan-
92. Argued for 52 Years, Settled in Two Days, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS,
Dec. 3, 1997, at I (condensing and translating original article appearing in Ross. VESTI, Nov.





Turkic or Islamic-fundamentalist influence in the Caucasus and Central
Asia at Russia's expense. In both cases, Yeltsin's policy swung back and
forth from nervous rivalry to a relationship so cooperative that it included
the sale of arms. In the case of Iran, this cooperative attitude on Mos-
cow's part occasioned frequent protests from Washington, but as long as
Iran behaved responsibly in Russia's backyard, Moscow saw no reason to
accede to U.S. pressure to cut off arms sales or nuclear cooperation. In
1997 Yeltsin sought to calm Washington with a pledge that, while limited
arms sales would continue, there would be no deliveries to Iran of mis-
siles or missile technology.
No less a threat to stability in the Persian Gulf region, and no less
undesirable in Washington's eyes as a possible partner for Moscow, was
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In the U.N. Security Council, both Gorbachev's
and Yeltsin's representatives repeatedly voted to support international
sanctions on Iraq, although Moscow ranked second only to Baghdad itself
in the amount of economic harm it has suffered as a result. Given Rus-
sia's own economic crisis, Yeltsin's persistence in supporting costly U.N.
sanctions was prominently used by his domestic opponents as a prime
example of Russia's sacrificing its own interests to satisfy the West.
Stung by the criticism, Yeltsin periodically lobbied in the West for an
easing of sanctions as recognition of Iraq's "good behavior." Saddam
Hussein forced the sanctions issue to the forefront in the fall of 1997,
when he ordered the expulsion of American members of the U.N. weap-
ons inspections team, resulting in the withdrawal of the entire U.N. team.
Capitalizing on his personal ties, Primakov wrested an agreement from
the Iraqis to readmit the team, in return for a promise that Russia would
"energetically" work for early lifting of sanctions. The Iraqis, however,
refused to allow inspections of certain "presidential sites."
Moscow clearly wanted to push such details to the background, pre-
ferring to capitalize on what Primakov termed "a great success for Rus-
sian diplomacy... achieved without the use of force and without a show
of force."95 In the words of a Russian reporter, the Americans were essen-
tially isolated, and Russia strengthened its reputation "as an influential
power not only throughout the Middle East ...but in the world as a
whole. 96 Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvaliuk also saw in the role
Russia was playing in the crisis a special significance for broader Russian
foreign policy: "[t]he world is increasingly coming to realize that Russia
95. Hot Spot: The World Opposes War, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec
24, 1997, at I (condensing and translating Irina Denisova's article originally appearing in
Ross. GAZETA, Nov. 21, 1997, at 4), available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
96. Russia Succeeds in Averting a New War in the Persian Gulf, CURRENT DIG. OF THE
POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 24, 1997, at 1 (condensing text of first of two items originally
appearing in NEZAVISIMAYA, Nov. 21, 1997, at 1), available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP
File.
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is emerging or has emerged from its period of confusion and major prob-
lems, and that it is now oriented toward conducting an energetic and con-
structive foreign policy. Many countries have confidence in the balanced
line we are pursuing." 97 He stressed that Russian diplomats were not act-
ing as "undiscriminating defense attorneys" for Iraq,98 since they were
calling for strict fulfillment of all the UN resolutions. "But at the same
time we are saying that Iraq must be shown that there is light at the end of
the tunnel. Not fire but light." 99
When the Iraqi conflict flared up again in January 1998, Yeltsin
again sought to gain both international and domestic prestige by sending
Posuvaliuk to Baghdad in search of a solution. Embarrassed when a
"deal" announced in Moscow was immediately denied by the Iraqis, an
angry Yeltsin warned that continued U.S. military activities in the Persian
Gulf could bring dire consequences. Military action was averted when
U.N. Secretary General Annan's mediation defused the crisis. Claiming a
share of the credit, the Russians again saw in the Persian Gulf crisis some
hopeful signs that the ability of the United States to dictate its will was
waning, and that "the unipolar world is receding into the past."'
00
Despite its relative activism in the Far East and the Middle East,
however, Moscow's interests in the "non-West" in the Yeltsin period
were distinctly more limited than in the prior period. The termination of
the global ideological and geopolitical struggle with the United States,
together with the significant limitations on Russia's ability to project
economic influence, has caused a reorientation of Moscow's priorities to
those areas that border the post-Soviet states. However, the end of the
Cold War has not brought peace to the countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Thus, the inescapable fact that billions of dollars of ad-
vanced weaponry have been Moscow's dominant export to these re-
gions-and a significant one for the U.S. as well-is a legacy shared by
Yeltsin and Clinton, and a sobering portent that future conflicts could
pose even greater dangers to world peace.
97. Saddam is a Time Bomb, CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 24, 1997, at
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Now that he has resigned from the presidency of Russia, historians
have already begun to debate whether Boris Yeltsin deserves the appella-
tion of Great Man or Great Failure. There is no doubt about Yeltsin's
skills as a destroyer, for he clearly played a major role in bringing down
the Soviet communist system and in breaking up the USSR, as well as in
clearing away the remnants of Soviet-style political institutions in post-
Soviet Russia. It is about his qualities as a builder that the debate rages.
His defenders cite his record in advancing the cause of democracy in
Russia through his respect for the electoral process, the freedom of
speech and press, his efforts to achieve compromise at critical junctures,
and his tendency to support the efforts of market reformers. His efforts
made possible the first law-governed electoral transfer of power in the
thousand-year history of his country. His detractors, however, cite his
ego-driven and authoritarian style of rule, the absence of a vision or pro-
gram for his country, his apparent insecurity and lack of personal disci-
pline, his inconsistency, his willingness to resort to violence against in-
ternal enemies, and his penchant for destabilizing Russia's politics.
Our survey of Yeltsin's foreign policy can only support a judgment
that his record in responding to the challenges facing Russia is decidedly
a mixture of successes and failures. Each of the challenges he faced in
1991-92 is being passed on to his successor unresolved. With respect to
the task of defining a new national identity for Russia and a basic concept
for its national security, the detractors are undoubtedly right in bemoan-
ing Yeltsin's inability to articulate a vision or a larger sense of purpose
behind which his people could unite. The inability to accept Russia's new
geopolitical confines and the question of the reconstitution of the Russian
Empire in some form is still alive in some political circles in Moscow.
Yeltsin's famous quest for a "national idea" came up empty, and popular
confusion about Russia's identity has not been quieted. Yeltsin himself
confessed in his autobiography to this lack of strategic vision:
Where is this Yeltsin taking us? I think the answer will intrigue many
people. I am not presenting people with a global strategic goal. I am
not setting my sights on some shining peak that must be scaled. Nor
am I trying to wipe out the entire path traversed until now. No. The
chief goal of this restless president is Russia's tranquility.
10 1
In seeking to construct a new set of policy-making institutions, Yel-
tsin managed to impose a constitution that endows the electorate with a
measure of responsibility for the choice of leaders, but that lacks the criti-
101 YELTSIN, supra note 58, at 293.
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cal linkages of accountability between legislative and administrative or-
gans. The "super-presidential" system has functioned better than the para-
lyzed confusion that existed before the new constitution was adopted. But
it is widely acknowledged that Russia would not fare so well in the hands
of a president with less respect for democratic niceties or civil liberties,
and there is broad agreement on the need for amendments to the constitu-
tion (though not on their content). In the realm of foreign policy-making,
the Yeltsin era was plagued by a proliferation of councils and staffs with
overlapping responsibilities, and it was not until a respected senior per-
sonage was brought to the helm of the foreign ministry that a modicum of
policy coordination was achieved.
With only two years of positive growth recorded in the 1990s, and
with the standard of living of the vast majority of the population much
more depressed than in the previous decade, it is difficult to argue that
Yeltsin's record in the realm of economic and social change is "mixed."
Nevertheless, many observers argue that the foundations for a viable
market economy have been laid. If Yeltsin's successor is willing to fight
for passage of legislation ensuring more stable financial institutions and
enforceability of contracts, and if he is willing to stem massive corruption
and capital flight, further progress is in sight-bearing in mind Prime
Minister Putin's caution that even ten years of 8% annual growth will
bring Russians to the per capita income level of today's Portuguese.
Although Yeltsin clearly preferred the use of diplomacy over coer-
cion in dealing with the new states of the "near abroad," and although he
managed to overcome extremist opposition to settle major issues with
Ukraine-the most important of these states-it would be impossible to
contend that his legacy includes establishment of mutual trust and a per-
ception of the need for tighter economic and security integration in the
former Soviet space. Ethnic and religious conflict continues in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia, but the once-feared cultural and political assaults
from Turkey and Iran have not reached the dimensions once forecast.
However, the "great game" for control of the vast energy resources of this
region has intensified, and Russia has not been able to cast itself in the
role of a benevolent partner in this contest.
In the former Soviet states, as in Eastern Europe, the shadow cast by
NATO enlargement calls attention to one of the most disturbing legacies
of 1990s relations between Russia and the West. Though he managed to
elbow his way to the table of the G-7 and other institutions, Yeltsin's
Russia-its reputation blackened by continuing brutal warfare in Chech-
nya-has not been accepted as a full partner in Europe's economic, po-
litical, and security networks. Yeltsin's "partnership" with China appears
to be built mainly on common opposition to American unilateralism; its
only other meaningful dimension is an arms trade that promises to further
destabilize the East Asian region. Japan and Korea are as distant from
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Russia as they were at the beginning of the decade, and dangers of nu-
clear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia have mag-
nified despite Russia's professed interest in cooperative efforts to stem
them.
True, there is no foreseeable external threat to Russia's borders-
though the prospects for internal disarray have been revived by the war in
Chechnya-and Yeltsin left Russia facing no proclaimed external adver-
saries. No longer does the defense sector claim the lion's share of Rus-
sia's resources, and this reversal has been achieved without overt rebel-
lion from the armed forces. But Yeltsin's angry outbursts over perceived
American unilateralism in Iraq in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999 escalated
at the end of his term, in his tirade over Western protests about his
Chechnya policy, to a veiled nuclear threat. Apart from what it says about
Yeltsin's undiplomatic style, this pattern of protest reveals the immense
frustration that Russia's policymakers and people still feel at having been
cast down from the heights of super-power and relegated to a role of
seeming insignificance. Although this can be attributed in part to occa-
sional Western arrogance and insensitivity, in part it also testifies to Yel-
tsin's failures as a policy-maker and diplomat.
Clearly, some of the blame for these failures rests with Yeltsin's per-
sonal weaknesses. More than one observer has commented on his unsta-
ble personality, and tales of his bouts of excessive drinking and depres-
sion, especially at times of seeming triumph and opportunity, have passed
well beyond the rumor stage. On numerous occasions, such as during
foreign visits to Sweden and Germany, his well-publicized erratic behav-
ior left his staff struggling to bail him out of embarrassing situations. His
autocratic style of rule occasionally seemed to border on megalomania;
few shared Yeltsin's pleasure in his references to himself as "Tsar Boris
the First." Jealous of the power of subordinates, eager to decide all major
questions, but reluctant to shoulder responsibility, Yeltsin seemed to de-
light in setting opposing forces in his administration against each other,
apparently blind to the inconsistencies and instability that resulted. His
desire to be embraced by world leaders who played up to his ego contrib-
uted to the contradictions in policy. As Lilia Shevtsova has written,
"when he was in Moscow he would heatedly and sincerely make a scape-
goat of the West, but when he was back in the West under the influence
of the friendly attention of his host, Yeltsin would make concessions that
were unanticipated even by his closest foreign policy associates."
10 2
At the root of Yeltsin's failures in foreign policy, however, was his
lack of an overaching vision of where he was taking his country. Despite
the production of documents solemnly listing "concepts" and "doctrines,"
policy objectives were not clearly defined, and Yeltsin kept shuffling per-
102 LILIA SHEVTSOVA, YELTSIN'S RUSSIA 141 (1999).
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sonnel at such a rate that implementation became impossible. This ab-
sence of a guiding philosophy-in Dimitri Simes' words, "this preoccu-
pation with political tactics at the expense of substantive policy"- has
produced a foreign policy that seems to lurch from point to point.,, 3
Returning to Greenstein's framework, we can conclude by speculat-
ing whether the outcomes of Russian foreign policy in the last decade
would have been expected to occur even if the critical variable-the per-
sonality of Yeltsin-had been absent. Would it have made a difference to
Russia's place in the world if the August 1991 coup-plotters had suc-
ceeded in removing Yeltsin from the political scene, or if Rutskoi and
Khasbulatov had succeeded in ousting Yeltsin in October 1993, or if
Zyuganov had won the June 1996 presidential elections, or if Yeltsin had
died on the operating table the following autumn? The clear answer: for
better or for worse, Russia's course would not have been the same. Or to
frame our speculation in another way: where would Russia be today had
its first president been a committed democrat with a clear vision of where
he wanted the country to go and the self-discipline to pursue that vision?
The Yeltsin legacy is indeed a mix of success and failure, but there is
little doubt that the foreign policy of Russia has felt enormous impact
from the powerful personality of the man who ruled in the Kremlin in the
1990s.
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